Since Caremark has built up a reputation for excellence and the company has remained one of the leading UK and international providers of home care services. Our proven home care business formula works because it provides people with the option to receive excellent care at home in a form tailored to the needs of the individual. Specialised home care from qualified and experienced carers also helps alleviate pressure on limited NHS resources.
Most importantly, your clients will benefit from being looked after in the comfort and security of their own homes. The care and support they receive can help them to enjoy a fuller, happier life. You will get tremendous value in return for your initial Caremark franchise investment. This includes essential training, on-going advice and support and also a whole package of start-up assets.
Most importantly, the initial package you receive will include your licence to use the Caremark brand, which carries with it instant credibility as a highly respected care service provider. With such indispensable assets at your disposal, we can help ensure that your business has the best possible start. You will have the potential to earn a good future income, as well as enjoy a high level of personal job satisfaction from day one.
(DOC) FRANCHISING AS A STRATEGY FOR SMALL BUSINESS GROWTH | Dr Senka Borovac Zekan - milrarasfi.ga
At Caremark we want to make it as easy as possible for our new franchisees to set up their business and start earning money. Garg and Rasheed and Douma and Schreuder , p. In the case that one party depends more on the business relationship than the other, for example a special investment is due, could lead to hold up problems. The principal tries to protect himself through refunds, e.
The refunds provide a good punishment method to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of the agent. Another possibility to avoid opportunistic behaviour is the creation of a long-lasting business relationship, e. Lafontaine This is the case when the environment has influence before ex-ante the agent makes the decision, if he will work well. The principal can observe the decision of the agent, but is not able to take into account the uncertainties in the environment.
Because of that, the agent could misinterpret the environmental framework and thus legitimate his behaviour. Besanko, Dranove and Shanley For example, in a law firm, each team member could be a principal, because he gives instruction to the team in order to obtain satisfying results from the team production. At the same time each team member is an agent and committed to work in the best interest of the team.
It is impossible that everyone can control everyone at any give time and because the profit will be divided by all of them, all could have an incentive to live off the cost of the other team members.
In conclusion this means that because of the permanent asymmetry of information between principal and agent there is no optimum solution. If this were the case, than would it be clear for the principal, which mistakes the agent has made, and which are caused by uncertainties in the environment. As a result, the principal could influence the agent so that they work side by side and if not, he would sanction him. This means there is a need for a pareto-optimum agency contract, which would take into account the minimisation welfare loss against the first-best solution in which information would be costless and for everybody available.
Jensen and Meckling and Douma and Schreuder , p. The principal agent theory considers contracts where the principal delegates decisions to an agent. This can be transferred to franchising arrangements, because these arrangements involves information asymmetries and target conflicts. Free riding is a situation where a franchisee does not behave to the agreed rules in the contract. Furthermore, through self-interest the franchisee damages the image of the franchise system of the principal. The franchisee does not have drawbacks because of this behaviour. For example, the franchisee could obtain through the production of poor quality, a cost advantage.
The franchisor would obtain a damaged image.
Brousseau and Glachant A point of criticism is the more unrealistic assumption of strong opportunistic behaviour self-interest, e. It considers not, how the organisational structure influences the behaviour. Shane However, this could be explained through the transactions cost analysis in 2. Under the assumption of bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviour and a particular situation of the transaction it will be attempt to find efficient coordination structures.
The transaction cost analysis approach founded by Coase , p. Williamson and Masten , p. That means transaction costs take into account internal transactions and market transactions. Transaction cost includes real, monetary costs as well as opportunity costs.ookkinsubtforo.gq
Multi-unit ownership strategy in franchising
Transactions can occur before ex-ante and after ex-post the conclusion of a contract. Williamson and Masten Uncertainty in a complex environment of markets makes it impossible to always obtain the appropriate information in regard to the belonging transaction. Furthermore uncertainty relates to the unpredictable future. Williamson argues that the choice of the operating structure and thus the costs of governance depend on the uncertainties and complexities within the surroundings.
As a consequence, he suggests that vertical integration could be a powerful tool that organisations can use to reduce ambiguity.
Physical assets and human assets are viewed as organisation-specific assets. Asset specificity affects transactions between parties. Asset specificity can be low for both parties, it can be for one party low and for the other party high or finally it can be for both high. The degree of asset specificity could be taken to measure if an organisation would reduce transaction costs whether if it integrates vertical or if it exchanges on the market.
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However, if an orgnaisation might integrate vertically it could control the transactions. The degree on specificity is the quasi-rent. This is the difference between the actual investment and the second best usage possibility. The higher the quasi-rent the higher the asset specificity. If the specificity is high, this results in a high degree of dependence between the contract partners. This again reinforces opportunistic behaviour.
An extreme case would be a bilateral monopoly; however, high asset specificity leads to high transaction cost. C K Christine Klock Author. Add to cart. Contents 1 Introduction 2 Agency theory and transaction costs theory 2. Finally, the dissertation will close with a conclusion in chapter six. See Appendix 1 Another problem besides the lack of all information is uncertainty in the environment and future which makes it impossible to write complete contracts.
Lafontaine 2. Besanko, Dranove and Shanley 2. Brousseau and Glachant A point of criticism is the more unrealistic assumption of strong opportunistic behaviour self-interest, e. Williamson and Masten 2.
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